The contradictions within this class will now set the future course for Pakistan’s economy and its politics
The general perception still,
and unfortunately, held by
many people, foreigners and
Pakistanis, is that Pakistan is
largely an agricultural, rural economy,
where “feudals” dominate
the economic, social, and particularly
political space. Nothing could
be further from this outdated, false
framing of Pakistan’s political economy.
Perhaps the single most significant
consequence of the social
and structural transformation under
way for the last two decades
has been the rise and consolidation
of a Pakistani middle class,
both rural, but especially, urban.
Class categories transformed
As academics know, signifiers of
social categories such as “class”
are no longer fashionable and we
work in an environment which no
longer theorises about classes of
any kind. The political category of
class has been replaced by numerous
other categories such as “institutions”
and other more generic
and broader substitutes.
This is particularly the case in
Pakistan, where while there is
much literature on Pakistan’s overdetermined
military, there is some
on the judiciary, media, gender,
but little research and academic
engagement with the social and
structural transformation which
results in how the nature of class
composition has changed over
time. The previous, more
simplistic and simplified class categories
such as feudals, industrialists,
and “the working class” have
not only been transformed but are
also now even more problematic.
In this academic environment,
where there is little research of
core social categories, trying to
identify and calculate the size of
the middle class becomes particularly
difficult.
While a definition, and hence estimation
of Pakistan’s middle class,
or middle classes, has not been
easy, the term has acquired much
prominence in social and anecdotal
references. Increasing references
to the middle class — durmiana
tubqa — both as a political
category but also as an economic
one, occur more regularly in the
media. Often, Pakistan’s middle
class is referred to by the consumer
goods that it has increasingly been
purchasing, from washing machines
to motorcycles. But more
importantly, the term is used for
those having an active political
constituency and presence. In
many ways, the terms used in India
after Narendra Modi’s 2014 election,
of an “aspiring” or “aspirational”
class — also somewhat
vague but nevertheless signifying
some political and developmentalist
notion — have also found some
currency in Pakistan.
Attempts to quantify Pakistan’s
middle class, largely based on income
and the purchase of consumption
goods, show that as
many as 42% of Pakistan’s population
belong to the upper and
middle classes, with 38% counted
as “the middle class”. If these numbers
are correct, or even indicative
in any broad sense, then 84 million
Pakistanis belong to the middle
and upper classes, a population
size larger than that of Germany
and Turkey. Anecdotal evidence
and social observations, supplemented
by estimates other than
what people buy, would also support
the claim that Pakistan’s
middle class is indeed quite
formidable.
Girls shining
Data based on social, economic
and spatial categories all support
this argument. While literacy rates
in Pakistan have risen to around
60%, perhaps more important has
been the significant rise in girls’ literacy
and in their education. Their
enrolment at the primary school
level, while still less than it is for
boys, is rising faster than it is for
boys. What is even more surprising
is that this pattern is reinforced
even for middle level education
where, between 2002-03 and 2012-
13, there had been an increase by as
much as 54% when compared to
26% for that of boys. At the secondary
level, again unexpectedly, girls’
participation has increased by 53%
over the decade, about the same as
it has for boys. While boys outnumber
girls in school, girls are catching
up. In 2014-15, it was estimated
that there were more girls enrolled
in Pakistan’s universities than boys
— 52% and 48%, respectively.
Pakistan’s middle class has realised
the significance of girls’ education,
even up to the college and university
level.
In spatial terms, most social scientists
would agree that Pakistan is
almost all, or at least predominantly,
urban rather than rural,
even though such categories are
difficult to concretise. Research in
Pakistan has revealed that at least
70% of Pakistanis live in urban or
urbanising settlements, and not in
rural settlements, whatever they
are. Using data about access to
urban facilities and services such
as electricity, education, transport
and communication connectivity,
this is a low estimate. Moreover,
even in so-called “rural” and agricultural
settlements, data show
that around 60% or more of incomes
accrue from non-agricultural
sources such as remittances
and services. Clearly, whatever the
rural is, it is no longer agricultural.
Numerous other sets of statistics
would enhance the middle class
thesis in Pakistan.
Rise of the ‘youthias’
It is not only in economistic, or
more specifically, consumerist,
terms, that the middle class has
made its presence felt, but also
politically. The “naya Pakistan” of
today is dominated by middle class
voices and concerns. The
“youthias”, as they are called, a
political category of those who
support Imran Khan and his style
of politics, are one clear manifestation
of this rise, as is the large support
in the Punjab of Nawaz Sharif
and his Punjab Chief Minister
brother, Shahbaz Sharif. The developmentalist
agenda and the social
concerns of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
government which is
ruled by Imran Khan’s party, and
those in the Punjab where the
Sharif family dominates, are representative
of this new politics.
Free laptops, better governance,
more information technology, better
schooling, better urban health
facilities, jobs for the educated
youth, the right to information,
and so on, represent government
initiatives to appease this political
category.
Vague, expectational foundations
from Europe and other western
countries, that the middle class
is necessarily democratic, tolerant
and secular, have all come undone
by events in recent years. The expectation
that the middle class is
necessarily “liberal” no longer
stands.
In the case of Pakistan, on account
of many decades of a forced
Islamisation discourse, backed up
by Saudi funding and growing jihadism,
one might argue that
Pakistan’s middle class is “Islamist”,
very broadly defined, and also
socially conservative and intolerant,
pro-privatisation and pro-capital.
Yet, social and structural
transformation, from Internet access
to girls’ education and social
media activism, also results in
trends that counter such strict formulations.
While still probably socially
conservative, contradictory
counter-narratives would suggest
that there is a large noticeable tension
which exists within this category
of the middle class which
questions a simple categorisation
of its ideological moorings.
A politics hardly progressive
It would be trite, though not incorrect,
to argue that Pakistan’s
middle class is in an ideological ferment
and transition, but its aspirations
do not extend to groups and
social classes outside its own large
category. They are not interested
in the working classes or their issues,
they are comfortable making
economic and political alliances
with large capitalist landowners
and industrialists, many of whom
have close links with the military.
At present, the politics of this
middle class is a far cry from even a
soft version of the term “progressive”.
It is the multiple fractions
within the middle class which have
been dominating the political and
developmentalist agenda in
Pakistan. It is going to be the contradictions
within this middle class
which will now set the future
course for Pakistan’s economy and
its politics. Perhaps from the
fringes of this middle class, one
could possibly expect the emergence
even of progressive forms of
politics.
S. Akbar Zaidi is a political economist
based in Karachi. He teaches at Columbia
University in New York, and at the IBA in
Karachi
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